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The human brain is often considered the most complex system known. It has a fantastic capacity to learn and remember, to recognize
patterns in space and time, solve problems of all kinds, innovate tools and machines, create beautiful art and science. Is it reasonable to
believe that we, in a foreseeable future, will be able to understand all the wonders of our own brain, enough to be able to mimic it and
build artificial brains and minds that correspond to or even surpass the capacity of the human origin? Can we seriously believe that we
(soon, or ever) will be able to build robots that know of and can reflect upon their own existence?
This review of the book, The Brain and AI, deals with such issues, but in a very special way. It is written as a fascinating dialogue
between the two authors, Chinese scientist Fanji Gu and German engineer Karl Schlagenhauf, where they discuss the development of
neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI) with a critical examination of given ‘‘truths” in these fields. The Brain and AI is indeed worth
reading for many reasons, regardless if you are a student or researcher in any of the many fields of science discussed here (e.g. physics,
computer science, neuroscience, cognitive science psychology, social science), or if you are just interested in the current and future devel-
opment of brain research and artificial intelligence. The book is both educating and entertaining and can be strongly recommended.
 2020 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
).
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The human brain is often considered the most complex
system known. It has a fantastic capacity to learn and
remember, to recognize patterns in space and time, solve
problems of all kinds, innovate tools and machines, create
beautiful art and science. Is it reasonable to believe that we,
in a foreseeable future, will be able to understand all the
wonders of our own brain, enough to be able to mimic it
and build artificial brains and minds that correspond tohttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2020.07.002
1389-0417/ 2020 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons
⇑ Address: Biometry and Systems Analysis Group, Dept Energy &
Technology, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala,
Sweden.or even surpass the capacity of the human origin? Can
we seriously believe that we (soon, or ever) will be able
to build robots that know of and can reflect upon their
own existence?
Indeed, it seems that almost everybody today is talking
about and has an opinion on artificial intelligence, AI.
Either hoping such systems will solve all kinds of problems
that humans can, or currently can’t solve, or fearing that
AI will soon take over and make humans obsolete, or both.
Some enthusiasts even believe AI systems eventually can
become conscious and have a will of their own, an own
agenda. How realistic are these hopes and fears?
Having been involved in computational neuroscience for
over thirty years, I’ve often been thinking about these and.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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have consciousness and free will. I therefore gladly
accepted the invitation to review the book, The Brain and
AI, which I had heard about for some time, but had not
found time to read yet. Now, this gave me a good opportu-
nity to do so, and I surely didn’t regret my decision. It was
like reading a thrilling science fiction story, or more accu-
rately, taking part in an extremely interesting dialogue
between two highly informed and competent experts in
their respective fields, Chinese scientist Fanji Gu and Ger-
man engineer Karl Schlagenhauf (from now on referred to
as just Karl and Fanji).
2. General comments on the book style and structure
The Brain and AI is unique in many respects. Perhaps
the most unusual and fascinating aspect of the book is that
it is based on the email exchange over five-six years
between two authors from quite different backgrounds
and cultures, who have never met physically. In fact, the
book consists almost entirely of their numerous and long
emails (which inevitably had to be somewhat edited to fit
a book). Sometimes there are several weeks in between let-
ters in their feedback loop, as if they seriously considered
the letter sent by the other and carefully planned for their
response (which they probably did). Through this process,
a true friendship seems to have developed, apparently
based on mutual respect and understanding, and sharing
a genuine curiosity.
The book is a social adventure with two young (in their
minds), but experienced gentlemen explore a multi-
dimensional space, trying to find their way through a myr-
iad of facts, theories, and wild ideas. The authors compare
themselves with small children who are curious and ask
naı̈ve but sincere questions, which people in general
wouldn’t do. In order to give a taste of the witty and
humorous style of the book, I will in this review frequently
quote the authors when appropriate.
Karl and Fanji themselves refer to their interaction as a
discussion, but I think it is rather a good example of an
excellent dialogue. For example, Fanji says that, ‘‘Discus-
sion, especially with a smart friend, is the best whetstone
to sharpen one’s mind. Many puzzles become suddenly
clear. Some ideas, which one has never thought of, would
come to one’s head during discussion.” To me, this seems
to better fit with dialogue, which is often considered to be
more explorative, by integration, than a discussion, which
typically aims at examining a topic by breaking it up in
parts. A good dialogue is characterized by mutual respect,
a willingness to give and receive, and a readiness to change
your mind. Above all, a dialogue can be seen as a cooper-
ative search for understanding and meaning, which may
provide new insights to everyone involved. I think the book
is like a handbook for this kind of dialogue.
In addition to an exchange of facts and theories, the dia-
logue in this book is spiced up with a great sense of humor
that both authors share. They could say something like, ‘‘Icannot exclude the possibility that I am totally wrong”, or
‘‘I was impressed by how many things I didn’t know or for-
got”, or ‘‘No goldmaker can fool Fanji, neither Markram
nor Kurzweil. I’m proud of you again, my dear friend”.
In the beginning of their email exchange, the frequency
of letters was quite high, with typically 1–2 days between,
but towards the end the letters tend to come less frequently,
with typically 1–2 months in between. All emails are quite
long, much longer than what is common, and more like
old-fashioned letter conversations. Both Karl and Fanji
are all the time very polite, and often start their letters by
quoting the other’s main point(s), which they then com-
ment on. A typical starting phrase in the letters could read
(Fanji): ‘‘Thank you very much for your detailed reply and
kind words. I completely agree with every point you men-
tioned in your mail”, or (Karl): ‘‘Thank you for your beau-
tiful letter and your kind words. Well, I have to tell you
that it is sheer fun to follow your hints and questions which
always contain so much wisdom and add new perspectives.
Without you I would never have taken the effort to
immerse myself in all those thrilling matters you’ve been
drawing my attention to or to formulate ideas I was dealing
with for quite some time.”
Also the ending of the letters are often full of polite or
even ‘‘childish” humor, such as: ‘‘I am also looking for-
ward to hearing your story about your meeting with
(Popper, 1976) and Korzybski, a little similar to the king
in the Stories from the Arabian Nights”, or in another letter:
‘‘Oh! You are really a modern Scheherazade, who always
reached the most interesting point when daylight came
and asked the Sultan if he wished to know the end of the
story. Of course, he wished! Although I am not the Sultan,
and you are not Scheherazade, please do tell me the other
half of your criticism!”
The Brain and AI is divided into three parts (which each
could be a book): I. Brain Research, a New Continent to be
Explored, II. Mystery of Consciousness and Myth of Mind
Uploading, and III. The Third Spring of AI. The 62 email
letters are listed as 31 pairs, with ten letters in each one
of the three parts. The pairing is somewhat artificial,
because it is more like a continuous stream of letters, flow-
ing like a meandering river through a landscape of neurons
and computer chips. However, in the Introduction there is
a very helpful guide for readers, where all the letters are
grouped (again somewhat arbitrary) into five main topics:
1) Scientific Methodology, 2) Open Problems in Brain
Research, 3) Disputing Problems in Artificial Intelligence,
4) The Mystery of Consciousness, and 5) Big Science Plan.
In this way, it is easy to find the letters which are focusing
on a specific topic, even if they also contain many other
things.
3. Comments on the content
Even if The Brain and AI is mainly about the develop-
ment of neuroscience and artificial intelligence (AI), pri-
marily with a critical examination of given ‘‘truths” in
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technology in general, as well as commenting on political
and social developments in Germany, China and elsewhere.
Indeed, the title of the book could well have been The Brain
and All.
The main theme throughout the book is the criticism of
the strong claims and promises with regard to AI that are
given by (some) researchers in the field, and by the Euro-
pean Human Brain Project (HBP) in particular. In fact, it
was when Fanji read about the claim that this HBP would
create an artificial human brain model within ten years -
‘‘down to the level of ion channels, or even molecules, up
to the level of consciousness” - that he became very skepti-
cal. He started to investigate rather deeply the background
and scientific-technological developments that (im)possibly
could lead to such a result. It was also with these doubts
Fanji first turned to Karl, with whom he had got in contact
through their common friend Hans Braun.
It was soon obvious that Karl shared Fanji’s well-
founded skepticism against the hype of AI, where promises
as well as worries seem far too exaggerated. For example,
Karl responding to one of Fanji’s letter says: ‘‘I can say
that your inbuilt skeptical Fanji-mode not to buy into
every kind of bullshit because it’s published in great
magazines or by great names is a good x-ray method to
inspect the emperor’s new clothes. . .. . . You were right with
your critical attitude against the HBP and I think you are
right again with your skeptical view on all those brain-like
technical phantasies. I would even go further and say that
it is much worse than you have suspected. The gap between
a) pretention and promises and b) real performance is just
ridiculous.”
The authors give several arguments for their skeptical
view, in particular that we still do not know enough about
the brain and its processes to make an adequate model of
it. For example, we do not yet know what the basic element
of the brain is (the neuron, the synapse, the ion channel, the
neuronal assembly, or the micro-column or hyper-column),
or maybe there is no universal basic element at all. To
choose the appropriate basic element depends on the con-
text, and in particular when exploring the mind, we don’t
have a clue. We don’t even know what kind of coding is rel-
evant. Perhaps the nervous system uses different coding
schemes for different situations? The firing patterns may
not carry all the information, but instead other factors have
to be considered, perhaps involving the entire nervous sys-
tem. The complexity of the human brain is usually under-
estimated in any attempt to describe or make any useful
models of it.
In the first part, but actually throughout the whole
book, Karl and Fanji give a fascinating account of the his-
tory of brain science and AI research, but also of the phi-
losophy of mind. This history is characterized not only
by successes, but also by a series of disappointments, often
because of too high expectations. The authors also discuss
specific matters, such as different kinds of learning and
memory (human and computer), the scientific history andwhat today is known about various memory mechanisms
and functions, and how they are modeled.
The authors often cite or refer to many more or less
famous scientists, inventors, or philosophers with quota-
tions, which they also comment upon. (I have myself met
many of the cited people personally, and I can easily, with
some amusement, relate to the stories Fanji and Karl tell).
One of their (and my) favorites is neuroscientist Walter
Freeman, whose work on cortical neurodynamics
(Freeman, 2000), as well as his ideas on the action-
perception cycle, intentionality and meaning (Freeman,
1999a,b), both authors appreciate and praise. Actually,
Fanji had known Freeman for a long time, and introduced
his work and ideas to Karl, who then exclaims: ‘‘I generally
find Freeman’s view very refreshing. . .. And here he comes
to the conclusion that the whole idea of the brain as an
information processing machine is wrong and misleading.
He says (again) that this idea was imported by computer
people and logicians and that the discipline of mind-
research is confused since this wrong perspective became
the paradigm. . ...I’m not sure whether his alternative to ‘in-
formation’ as the mind’s currency which he postulates as
‘meaning’ is the ultimate solution to the problem. But in
any event, I can say that your friend Walter has changed
my point of view in a field where I believed to be on safe
ground.”
Another time, Karl expresses his appreciation of Fanji’s
description of Freeman views on various brain-mind issues:
‘‘You gave an excellent and crisp interpretation of Free-
man’s position about how the brain deals with perception,
meaning, expectations, and intentions. Actually, it’s the
best and clearest I have seen anywhere!. . ... . .To me, he gets
closest to the problem among all the authors I have read so
far.”
Of course, Karl and Fanji also refer to many other sci-
entists and experts, even those they think are not so smart.
For example, they give several examples of how people
have over-estimated the capacity of the artificial systems
of the time, often with promises that in a few years (some-
times decades), the artificial systems (or AIs) will be as
powerful as a rat, a cat, or even a human brain. One exam-
ple is when the so-called Perceptron was presented in the
late 1950s by New York Times as, ‘‘the embryo of an elec-
tronic computer that [the Navy] expects will be able to walk,
talk, see, write, reproduce itself and be conscious of its
existence.” Another quote is from the AI guru, Marvin
Minsky, who in 1970 declared: ‘‘In from three to eight years
we will have a machine with the general intelligence of an
average human being.”(Minsky 1970) This was about
40 years before the similarly bold HBP claim was given,
and not much had happened in between that could make
such a prophetic claim more likely to become true.
One of the negative consequences of exaggerated enthu-
siasm and promise making, is that it results in disappoint-
ments and halted funding when science and technology
can’t deliver. The authors refer to several ‘‘AI winters” in
the past, and concludes: ‘‘the most efficient way to spoil
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ter is to wildly exaggerate the power of this field or give
unrealistic magnificent prospects.”
I think this historical outlook should be a good lesson to
scientists and funders regarding the current hype with AI.
A little modesty and realism in their claims and prophecies
wouldn’t hurt (and would probably avoid eventual embar-
rassment and disappointment later on), but modesty is not
the strategy used in the race for grants and government
money. Or, as the Karl and Fanji state in the book: ‘‘In
hindsight, everybody who was bold enough to put a date
on such AI-promises over the last 30 years actually made
a fool of himself.”
The main criticized figure in the book is Henry Mark-
ram. Like detectives, Fanji and Karl have dug up the back-
ground of Markram’s approach to the EU - in particular
regarding his earlier project, The Blue Brain Project
(Markram, 2012), and his clash with IBM - with the idea
of HBP, which he eventually came to lead (Markram
et al., 2015). No doubt, Markram has been an excellent
salesman for his scientific projects, and the successful mar-
keting process could well be extended to other areas of glo-
bal/EU/US/China policies and investments. But warning
signals should be taken seriously.
In addition to criticizing Markram and the HBP for
promising too much, Karl and Fanji are very critical to
Ray Kurzweil and the prophecies made, particularly in
his book, The Singularity is Near (Kurzweil, 2006) and
others (Kurzweil, 2012). The ‘‘singularity prophecy” says
that some day (soon) humans will be outsmarted by their
AI systems, and this is also a central issue discussed and
dismissed throughout the book. The authors regard it as
mere science-fiction (and unlikely to happen, at least not
within the time frame given by Kurzweil, who has been
hailed as a guru). Karl expresses this clearly: ‘‘It isn’t diffi-
cult to see the similarity between Kurzweil’s singularity
message of technical salvation and the biblical promise of
Moses leading his people to the promised land of milk
and honey”, or elsewhere, ‘‘Kurzweil wants his readers to
believe that everything in the world can be calculated if
you only have the right algorithm. Actually, many people
do believe this and I have the impression that the less they
understand about natural sciences and math the more they
seem to believe in this myth.”
In general, the authors are skeptical towards all Big
Science, which usually costs a lot of money. They argue
that funding of (young) individuals or small groups often
could be more successful in solving problems of AI and
the like, and give examples from garage inventors, such
as those of Google, Facebook etc. Pouring Big Money into
Big Science doesn’t necessarily lead to Big Progress in nei-
ther science nor technology.
Karl and Fanji again and again come back to the gen-
eral criticism, that the tasks to explore and describe the
brain and its functions, and to develop a brain-like, or even
a ‘‘brain inspired” (a word which Fanji prefers) intelligent
machine are quite different. Their main idea is that youdon’t have to understand the brain or human intelligence
in order to build powerful artificial intelligence. Technol-
ogy can sometimes benefit from being inspired by biology,
but doesn’t necessarily need to copy it. A typical example
discussed is the development of airplanes, as partly inspired
by birds and their wings, without copying the flying behav-
ior of birds.
In the second part of The Brain and AI, the authors dis-
cuss an(other) interesting book, Conversations on Con-
sciousness by Susan Blackmore (2005), where she
interviews 21 leading scientists and philosophers on issues
relating to consciousness. Fanji and Karl discuss the differ-
ent answers given there (regretting that Walter Freeman is
not among the interviewed), and are not satisfied with any
of the answers given to the important questions. Yet, about
half of the interviewed scientists/philosophers seem to
agree with Fanji that the special difficulty with conscious-
ness studies lies in the subjectivity and privacy of con-
sciousness. Historically, scientists have only studied
objective phenomena, using a third person perspective,
and any subjectivity had to be avoided. However, in con-
sciousness studies, subjectivity itself becomes the topic to
be studied, and hence, some of the interviewed thought
the available theories could not solve the mystery of con-
sciousness, and that new theories should be developed.
The other half of the interviewed scientists/philosophers
denied that there is any ‘‘hard problem” to solve, and that
consciousness is no different from any other problems in
science.
Both Fanji and Karl seem to adhere to the rather com-
mon view that consciousness emerges from brain activity
(and hence, they are skeptical towards panpsychism and
similar ideas). The big question, which the authors don’t
discuss very much is whether this emergent phenomenon
also could have causal effects on the neural parts at lower
levels of the (nervous) system organization. This rather
controversial issue of downward causation seems to be nec-
essary if there could be any free will, which the authors dis-
cuss to some extent later on. It is also a problem to see how
an emergent phenomenon could also be irreducible, as
suggested.
Fanji´s conclusion is that computer simulation may help
us to shed light on the brain mechanism of behaviors or
some observable functions, but that it can’t explain how
subjective experience emerges from objective processes.
There is no way to confirm that any program run on a com-
puter is having subjective experience, even if it could
declare it had.
Karl is perhaps more optimistic about the technologi-
cal advancements, and is convinced that engineers will
outperform natural scientists and will build more intelli-
gent machines much faster than biologists will compre-
hend the functioning of the brain, especially such
complex phenomena as consciousness. Karl believes that
technical progress is developing at an exponential rate,
while progress in biology and understanding the brain is
only linear.
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through the current state of AI research, in particular in
the US and China, and its possible development in the near
future. Despite their general skepticism apparent through-
out the book, the authors give some final positive remarks
about AI systems, which seem to have advanced faster than
and beyond what they initially believed. Actually, Karl and
Fanji are more impressed with the advancements regarding
image/pattern recognition and language translation than
with computer games, or problem solving in general. How-
ever, they don’t think ‘‘machines” will understand (e.g. a
translation, or anything else) in a foreseeable future, if ever.
While they both believe that mind-uploading is very unli-
kely, and that any ‘‘singularity” (i.e. that AI systems
become smarter/more intelligent than humans) is not near
in time, they (in particular Karl) do not rule out that it
might happen in the future. However, Fanji thinks it is
questionable if any artificial system will ever have a will
of its own, and even if we would know how to implement
it (which we are far from), there seems to be no reason to
try to create such a system.
Indeed, the question is if even humans have a free will. I
was actually quite happy to see that Fanji and Karl also
have a discussion on free will, which is a topic that has
interested me for many years (in particular lately as I’m
now working on this in an international collaborative
project, the Neurophilosophy of Free Will, www.neurophil-
freewill.org). Fanji quotes Samuel Johnson, who Susan
Blackmore mentions in her book on consciousness: ‘All
theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience is
for it.’ For Fanji, and many others, free will is the ability
to choose between different possible courses of action
unimpeded, but then the question is whether such choices
are conscious or unconscious, a problem which is in focus
of our own current research project. Again referring to
Walter Freeman’s view on the topic, Fanji believes that
the complex neurodynamics of the brain, involving circular
causality in a continuous action-perception cycle, provides
a possibility for free will, even if some of it is also uncon-
scious. With reference to complex hierarchical systems,
where ‘‘different laws may hold for different levels”, Fanji
considers free will to be an emergent property, apparently
similar and related to consciousness.
Karl seems to agree with all of what Fanji says about
free will, and stresses (which is also my own view) that
the experiments Benjamin Libet (Libet, 1985) carried out
in the 1980s, with small movements of a finger, is far too
simple to say anything about free will. He expresses this
as, ‘‘Planning a career or a marriage is a different kind of
game than lifting a finger or pressing a button after a signal
is given.” In addition, Fanji points out the important
aspect of a social dimension to our individual free will,
which is often ignored by neuroscientists. I agree and
believe this aspect needs much further consideration and
research.
The last letter in the book is by Karl and ends with an
optimistic view on the future, where he believes both heand Fanji, and the rest of the world, can be hopeful and
curious about what ‘‘wonders the young generation will
surprise us with.”
4. Summary and concluding remarks
Having read the entire book rather carefully, I can
conclude that it has given me both great joy and new
insights. Also many new details regarding the back-
ground and circumstances around the European HBP
and similar huge projects in the US and China, as well
as many other interesting things. In short, I have learnt
a lot from The Brain and AI. In this review, I have only
been able to give a few glimpses through my comments
and reflections on central themes in the book, but hope
it anyway can give some justice to the authors’ intentions
with it.
I found only very few flaws in this book, but in order not
to sound exclusively positive, there are a few issues, which
I’d like to bring up with the risk of instead sounding extre-
mely pedantic:
(a) The book lacks an index and a list of references, and
a few pictures or figures wouldn’t have hurt either. It
would also have been useful with the name of the
author (Fanji or Karl) on top of each page, to easier
see who says what, since it isn’t all the time easy to
see, if you browse through the book, as you are
bound to do - probably several times - even after
you have read it. The style and wit of both authors
are so similar so it is sometimes hard to distinguish
between the two.
(b) I think it is quite appropriate to compare the dis-
cussion/research on life and consciousness, but to
say that the problem of life is already solved, as
the authors assume (p II:91), is not correct – far
from it. We have some knowledge about what
characterizes living systems, but we don’t know
what life is, and not even how the first cells came
about.
(c) In many places in the book, the human brain is called
a ‘‘machine”. Actually. Walter Freeman emphasized
that the brain is not an information processing
machine, but rather a meaning creating system/organ
– not a machine! – as is stated in the book. I don’t
think Freeman ever called the brain a ‘‘machine”,
or at least, he didn’t think it works like a machine,
that just follows predetermined and mechanistic
rules. In fact, the machine metaphor, which has been
used for humans and other biological systems since
Descartes, is inappropriate and misleading, and
should have been abolished long ago. Also John
von Neumann (who is quoted in the book, page
II:141) emphasized that the brain is not a machine,
where algorithms are calculated, and that it is not a
digital device but an analogue one (Von Neuman,
1958). Indeed, the whole discussion in the current
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machine like, so the usage of the machine concept
for the brain is somewhat confusing.
(d) The statement (page I:84), ‘‘. . .now we know from
experiments that action is often a few hundred mil-
liseconds ahead of feeling”, is probably referring to
Libet’s experiments on the readiness potential, which
appears about 500 ms before a feeling of agency, but
that is not the same as to say that action precedes
feelings. If it refers to the reflex of moving e.g. a hand
from a hot stove, before you actually feel that it
hurts, it is not an ‘‘action” in a normal sense, it is just
a muscle movement.
(e) The authors often use the word ‘complicated’ (about
the brain) rather than ‘complex’. There is a difference
between complicated and complex, which is not made
clear in the text (e.g. on page II:12). A system can be
very complicated while not complex. A complex sys-
tem (usually) have emergent properties and behavior,
which cannot be calculated or predicted with the pre-
cision you can with a complicated system, given suf-
ficient computing power.
(f) There is a statement (page II:12), that ‘‘we know the
human brain can emerge consciousness. As for other
species, primates or even vertebrate animals may be
conscious, parrots and crows are likely, but insects
are not.” First, I would say that we don’t really know
that consciousness emerges from the activity of the
human brain, even if it is a fair assumption. Secondly,
most scientists would probably agree that mammals
and birds are conscious, and most likely other verte-
brates, but it is more doubtful with regard to inverte-
brates, such as insects, even though several scientists,
including Walter Freeman, do argue for conscious-
ness also in at least social insects. Since we don’t
really know what consciousness is, it is hard to say
anything about it in any species, or when in evolution
it first appeared. (This is one reason why some turn to
panpsychism as a possibility, meaning some kind of
consciousness is everywhere).
(g) The authors argue against the scholastic approach,
but I think they might have missed an important
aspect of this approach, which places a strong
emphasis on dialectic reasoning, rigorous conceptual
analysis and a careful drawing of distinctions. A topic
is often broached in the form of a question, where the
opponents’ responses are given, a counterproposal is
argued and the opponents’ arguments rebutted. This,
I believe, is in line with the approach in the current
book.
(h) A little surprising, there is no mentioning of Roger
Penrose and his criticism of AI, although he already
in his 1989 book, The Emperor’s New Mind
(Penrose, 1989), discussed many of the issues raised
in the current book. Penrose’s main criticism withregard to AI and conscious artificial systems, is that
consciousness is a non-computable process. The only
time when Penrose is mentioned in the book is when
the authors (on p. II.69) quickly dismiss Penrose’s
and Hameroff’s ideas on quantum theory and con-
sciousness, which has been much debated in the liter-
ature. Unfortunately, many people think this is the
main point made by Penrose, while instead he used
this as a possible(?) example of a non-computable
processes. Another scientist that I miss in the book
is Max Delbrück, ‘‘the father of molecular biology”,
whose book, Mind from Matter? (Delbrück, 1986)
touches upon many questions that is dealt with by
the authors, in particular with relation to life and
mind, and their origin(s).
In addition to the points raised above, I also feel
that the authors are maybe a bit too critical and skep-
tical to the possibilities that computational methods can
give any interesting insights in how the brain works.
For example, it is stated (on p. II:56) that, ‘‘The only
thing artificial neural networks have in common with
the neural nets in our brain is the naming”. As the
authors also recognize, models, computational or not,
are simplified representations of the real thing or pro-
cess, and so with artificial neural networks. Even Walter
Freeman, and many others (including my own group)
have been trying to mimic the structure and circuitry
of various brain areas, including different types of inhi-
bitory and excitatory neurons and their interactions,
that result in a neurodynamics, which resemble what
can be seen with e.g. EEG (Freeman, 2000,
Liljenström, 2012). This dynamics can then be related
to certain functions, such as associative memory, percep-
tion, or volition. Certainly, with many free parameters
you can simulate almost anything you want, but if (al-
most) all parameters are constrained by experimentally
measured data, computational models may aid in our
understanding of the relations of neural systems and
processes, and even predict the outcome of new experi-
ments. With regard to the ‘‘hard problem” of conscious-
ness, subjectivity and qualia, I agree that we don’t know
(yet) how to approach that with computational (or any
other scientific) methods. However, when it comes to
describing and tracing neuronal signals and the relation
between structure, dynamics, and (some) function, com-
putational methods can be very helpful.
To summarize, The Brain and AI is indeed worth reading
for many reasons, regardless if you are a student or
researcher in any of the many fields of science discussed
here (e.g. in physics, computer science, neuroscience, cogni-
tive science psychology, social science, . . ..), or if you are
just interested in the current and future development of
brain research and artificial intelligence. Actually, I
strongly recommend this book to anyone interested in the
H. Liljenström /Cognitive Systems Research 64 (2020) 29–36 35human brain, AI, and whatever might connect the two
(even though there is not much on the risks with AI, for
example using face recognition for social control, although
that could come in a second edition). The book is a must
for researchers in the field(s) and a delight for anyone inter-
ested in intellectual dialogues of any kind. Indeed, I found
myself quite often nodding in agreement, and every now
and then I heard myself laughing loudly when reading
the highly witty and humorous letters, as if I really took
part in the dialogue between these knowledgeable and tal-
ented gentlemen. I end this review with a few quotations
from the book, which I think exemplify the elegant and
humorous style all through, and which hopefully will
inspire you to read more.
Many formulations by both Fanji and Karl are true
gems, which could fit as inscriptions on the walls of univer-
sities, temples or government buildings, such as: ‘‘Worship-
ing a person for everything he says is a fault but denying
everything he says is another one”, ‘‘Being human includes
being vague and not precise”, or ‘‘If you want to find out
whether a bottle contains wine or vinegar, you don’t have
to drink the whole bottle”.
In addition to their own quite brilliant ‘‘proverbs”,
Fanji also sprinkle the dialogue with some old Chinese
wisdom, e.g. ‘‘Even a wise man sometimes makes a mis-
take; while even a fool occasionally hits on a good idea”,
or ‘‘A fool can ask more questions in an hour than a wise
man can answer in seven years”, and ‘‘Facts speak louder
than words”. Finally, with reference to some of the char-
acters in the current book, Fanji tells a story from a Chi-
nese Kungfu novel, Luding Ji: ‘‘Wei Xiaobao, the leading
character of the novel, was very good at telling absurd
stories to his opponents to make them believe what he
said. The trick which he played was to talk nonsense at
the key point, while giving a lot of true details on secondary
matters. It seems that all the gurus, no matter Western or
Eastern, ancient or modern, adopt a similar strategy!”Hans
Braun presenting the Chinese and English versions of the
book ‘‘The Brain and AI” at the International Conference
on Cognitive Neurodynamics, ICCN’19, in Alghero, Italy,
Oct 2019Walter Freeman and Fanji Gu at the International Con-
ference on Cognitive Neurodynamics, ICCN’13, in Sig-
tuna, Sweden, Jun 2013Declaration of Competing Interest
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